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INDEPENDENT

MEMORANDUM

To: Members of the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations

From: Christopher Shays
Chairman

Date: July 21, 2005

Subject: Briefing memo for the July 26th Subcommittee hearing

Attached find the briefing memo required by Committee rules for the
hearing on Tuesday, July 26th entitled, *DOE/ESE Security: How Ready is the
Protective Force?* The hearing will convene at 10:00 a.m., room 2154
Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

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BERNARD SANDERS, VERMONT,
INDEPENDENT

July 21, 2005

MEMORANDUM

To: Members of the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations

From: J. Vincent Chase, Chief Investigator

Re: Briefing memo for the hearing entitled, hearing entitled *DOE/ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force?* for Tuesday, July 26, 2005 at 10:00 a.m. in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building

PURPOSE OF THE HEARING

The purpose of the hearing is to determine the readiness of the DOE Office of Energy, Science and Environment (ESE) protective force to successfully defend against the terrorist threat identified in the October 2004 Design Basis Threat (DBT).

HEARING ISSUES

1. To what extent are DOE/ESE protective forces sufficiently trained and equipped to meet the terrorist threats identified by the intelligence community?
2. How effectively is DOE implementing the DBT and coordinating security efforts across the Office of Energy, Science and Environment?

BACKGROUND

The Department of Energy (DOE) created in 1977¹ employs a workforce of approximately 116,100 federal and contractor employees and maintains a complex of national laboratories, nuclear weapon production facilities, and other buildings on over 2.5 million acres of land. The Department of Energy has requested a budget of \$23.4 billion for FY 2006. **(Web Resource 1)**

The Department's safeguards and security funding request for the FY 2006 is \$1.44 billion. This funding is earmarked for nuclear weapons facilities, the protection of nuclear material, nuclear waste material at environmental cleanup sites, as well as safeguards and security activities at DOE laboratories. **(Attachment 1)**

The Department of Energy has four main missions:

- Ensuring a dependable energy supply for the American economy;
- Ensuring a secure, reliable nuclear deterrent for the nation's defense;
- Improving environmental quality related to energy production, and
- Advancing science and technology in energy-related area's. **(Web Resource 2)**

administered by DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Office of Energy, Science & Environment (ESE) program offices. **(Attachment 2)**

Office of Energy, Science and Environment (ESE)

The Office of Energy, Science and Environment is responsible for the day-to-day management and oversight of energy programs, science and

¹ The Department of Energy Organization Act, public law 95-91. The Department of Energy officially began operations on October 1, 1977. Pursuant to section 901 of the Act, President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 12009, prescribing October 1, 1977 as the effective date of the Act.

technology programs and environmental programs. The program offices are:

Office of Science-DOE science programs provide through public-private partnerships the technology capable of developing abundant, reliable, affordable and environmental sound energy supplies. This includes enhancing the nation's energy supply by conducting R&D in renewable energy, oil, gas, coal, and nuclear energy. The mission of the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) is to strengthen energy security, environmental quality, and economic vitality in public-private partnerships that: (1) enhance energy efficiency and productivity; (2) bring clean, reliable and affordable energy technologies to the marketplace; and (3) make a difference in the everyday lives of Americans by enhancing their energy choices and their quality of life. **(Web Resource 3)**

Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology-The Department of Energy is the single largest federal government supporter of basic research in the physical sciences in the United States, providing more than 40 percent of total federal funding for this area. DOE has the oversight and is the principal federal funding agency for research programs in nuclear physics, and fusion energy sciences. **(Web Resource 4)**

Environmental Management-The Department of Energy is responsible for cleaning up contaminated sites and disposing of radioactive waste left behind as a byproduct of nuclear weapons production, nuclear powered naval vessels and commercial nuclear energy production. DOE must mitigate the risks and hazards posed by the legacy of nuclear weapons production and research. Special nuclear material is present at former production sites, including the Savannah River Site in Savannah River, South Carolina, and the Hanford Site in Richland, Washington. **(Web Resource 5)**

The Office of Energy, Science and Environment has the responsibility for the management and security of sites that possess special nuclear material (SNM). Collectively, these program offices are requesting nearly \$436 million for security for FY 2006. For the sake of comparison, NNSA is requesting \$1 billion for security in FY 2006. Security funding requests by program office include \$75 million for Office of Science, \$74 million for

the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology, and \$228 million for Environmental Management.

ESE sites that possess special nuclear material (SNM) include:

Responsible program office	Site	Location
Office of Environmental Management	Savannah River Site	Aiken, South Carolina
Office of Environmental Management	Hanford Site	Richland, Washington
Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology	Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory	Idaho Falls, Idaho
Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology	Argonne National Laboratory-West	Idaho Falls, Idaho
Office of Science	Oak Ridge National Laboratory	Oak Ridge, Tennessee

Source: GAO.

Note: The two Idaho sites were consolidated as a single site, now known as the Idaho National Laboratory, in February 2005. In addition, federal oversight of the Idaho National Laboratory has been consolidated at DOE's Idaho Operations Office. Previously, DOE's Chicago Operations Office oversaw Argonne National Laboratory-West.

ESE relies on site contractors for implementation of safeguards and security programs. The contractors are responsible for conducting day-to-day security activities and adhering to DOE policies for operation of research and laboratory facilities and former nuclear weapons sites. (**Web Resource 6**)

Category I material includes plutonium and uranium in the following forms:

- Products containing high concentrations of plutonium or uranium, such as major nuclear components, and recastable metal; and
- High-grade materials, such as carbides, oxides, solutions, and nitrates.

The risks this special nuclear material pose vary, but DOE administers security programs to protect (1) against theft, sabotage, espionage, terrorism,

or other risks to national security and (2) the safety and health of DOE employees and the public.

Design Basis Threat

The key component of DOE's approach to security is the design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies the characteristics of the potential threats to DOE assets. A classified companion document, the *Adversary Capabilities List*, provides additional information on terrorist capabilities and equipment. The DBT is based on a classified, multiagency intelligence community assessment of potential terrorist threats, known as the postulated threat. The postulated threat is the intelligence community's official assessment of potential terrorist strategies against DOE facilities. The threat from terrorist groups is generally the most demanding threat contained in the DBT.

The DBT is an integral part of DOE efforts to secure and sustain domestic production and control of nuclear materials. Detailed elements of the DBT are classified. The DBT describes adversaries, such as terrorists, criminals, and foreign intelligence agents, in terms of their tactics, equipment, level of training, level of motivation, and other characteristics to assist DOE analysts in evaluating specific vulnerabilities.

The Department of Energy uses the DBT is to:

- Develop overall Safeguards and Security program requirements;
- Provide the basis for site specific safeguards and security program planning, implementation, and facility design; and
- Provide the basis for evaluating the effectiveness of systems that are implemented.

After the events of September 11, 2001, DOE began to reassess and improve the physical security at NNSA and ESE sites. DOE issued its current DBT in October 2004. The October 2004 DBT identifies a larger terrorist threat for DOE sites than had previous DBTs. Consequently, DOE is not requiring full compliance until October 2008 in order to allow program sites adequate time to implement measures to defeat a larger terrorist threat. Private contractors, who operate DOE's facilities, counter

the terrorist threat contained in the DBT with a multifaceted protective system. While specific measures vary from site to site, a key universal component of DOE's protective system is a heavily armed protective force equipped with such items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body armor, and chemical protective gear.

Two major organizations in DOE are responsible for securing Category I special nuclear material:

- The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE, is responsible for the nation's nuclear weapons programs and manages six sites that contain Category I special nuclear material.
- DOE's Office of Energy, Science and Environment (ESE) is responsible for DOE operations in areas such as energy research, basic physical science research, and environmental cleanup and manages five sites that collectively contain substantial quantities of Category I special nuclear material.

The DBT represents a departure from earlier DBT's in its basic structure. Specifically, according to GAO, key differences from the 1999 DBT and the current DBT include the following:

- *Increased adversary threat levels.* The DBT increases the terrorist threat levels for the theft of the department's highest value assets special nuclear material, although not in a uniform way. The 1999 DBT required ESE and NNSA sites to protect against only one terrorist threat level. Under the current DBT however, the theft of a nuclear weapon or test assembly is judged to be more attractive to terrorists, and sites that have these assets are required to defend against a substantially higher number of adversaries than are other ESE and NNSA sites that possess other forms of Category I special nuclear material. For example, the Pantex Plant, which, among other things, assembles and disassembles nuclear weapons, is required to defend to a higher level than sites such as Los Alamos or Y-12, both of which fabricate nuclear weapons components. DOE calls this a graded threat approach.

- *Specific protection strategies.* In line with the graded threat approach and depending on the type of materials possessed and the likely mission of the terrorist group, sites are now required to implement specific protection strategies, such as denial of access, denial of task, or containment with recapture for their most sensitive facilities and assets.
- *Wider range of terrorist objectives.* The current DBT recognizes a wider range of terrorist objectives, particularly in the area of radiological, chemical, and biological sabotage. The DBT requires the development of protection strategies for a range of facilities, such as some radioactive waste storage areas, that were not covered under the previous DBT.
- *Complexity.* With a graded approach and broader coverage, the current DBT is a more complex document than its predecessor. The 1999 DBT was 9 pages long, while the current DBT is 20 pages long.

Depending on the material, protective systems at DOE Category I special nuclear material sites are designed to accomplish the following objectives in response to the terrorist threat:

Denial of access. For some potential terrorist objectives, such as the creation of an improvised nuclear device, DOE may employ a protection strategy that requires the engagement and neutralization of adversaries before they can acquire hands-on access to the assets.

Denial of task. For nuclear weapons or nuclear test devices that terrorists might seek to steal, DOE requires the prevention and/or neutralization of the adversaries before they can complete a specific task, such as stealing such devices.

Containment with recapture. Where the theft of nuclear material (instead of a nuclear weapon) is the likely terrorist objective, DOE requires that adversaries not be allowed to escape the facility and that DOE protective forces recapture the material as soon as possible. This objective requires the use of specially trained and well-equipped response teams.

In part, as a result of the Subcommittee's investigation of DOE NNSA facility security, former DOE Secretary Spencer Abraham announced on May 7, 2004 a series of new facility security initiatives. These included enhancing protective forces, consolidating nuclear material, protecting sensitive information and a re-examination of the newly implemented 2003 design basis threat. **(Attachment 3)**

As part of the security initiatives, the DBT was reviewed and revised based on the evolving understanding of the threat level. The revised DBT, issued in October 2004, requires a reexamination of the security posture at each facility and a re-examination of how the threat level will be met. In addition, the 2004 DBT includes issues dealing with an improvised nuclear device (IND), radiological sabotage and measures to mitigate airborne threats.

Meeting the revised DBT requires an integrated security approach that will deploy security-based technical solutions to reduce the need for an increased protective force, consolidate materials by reducing the quantities of materials and the number of locations at which the materials are stored, and an elite protective force that is trained and equipped to meet the postulated threat.

GAO will release the report, *Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat*, (GAO-05-611) **(Attachment 4)** at the July 26th Subcommittee hearing and testify about how well DOE ESE is positioned to protect the nuclear material and operations from today's threat under the DBT. As part of the review, GAO conducted site surveys of protective force personnel to determine weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their sites.

DISCUSSION OF HEARING ISSUE

1. To what extent are DOE/ESE protective forces sufficiently trained and equipped to meet the terrorist threats identified by the intelligence community?

According to GAO, ESE protective force officers generally believe that they are ready to perform their mission. Specifically, 102 of the 105 officers GAO interviewed stated that they believed that they understand what was expected of them should a terrorist group attack the site. In addition, 65 of the 105 officers rated the readiness of their site's protective force as high, while 20 officers rated their protective force as somewhat or moderately ready to defend the site. Only a minority of the officers (16 of 105) GAO interviewed rated the readiness of their force to defend their sites as low. **(Attachment 4, pgs. 12-13)**

According to GAO, protective forces at ESE sites generally meet established DOE readiness requirements. However, GAO found some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend ESE sites. These include (1) protective force officers' lack of regular participation in force-on-force exercises; (2) the frequency and quality of training opportunities; (3) the lack of dependable communications systems; and (3) insufficient protective gear, including protective body armor and chemical protective gear, and the lack of armored vehicles. **(Attachment 4, pg. 12)**

Performance Testing and Training

A force-on-force exercise is one type of performance test during which the protective force engages in a simulated battle against a mock adversary force, employing the weapons, equipment, and methodologies postulated in the DBT. DOE believes that force-on-force exercises are a valuable training tool for protective force officers. Consequently, DOE policy requires that force-on-force exercises must be held at least once per year at sites that possess Category I quantities of special nuclear material or Category II quantities that can be rolled up to Category I quantities.

The Department of Energy Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 2004 review of protective forces found that the average protective

force officer is only likely to participate in a force-on-force exercise once every 4 to 6 years and concluded that the frequency of force-on-force exercises is not adequate for the training of protective forces.

In addition, the 2004 protective force review also found that the frequency, quality, and rigor of performance tests and training exercises vary widely throughout the complex. GAO interviews of protective force officers and protective force managers produced a similar result. For example, GAO asked protective force members whether they believed the force-on-force exercises they participated in were realistic and challenging. Only 23 of the 84 protective force officers that had participated in these exercises believed they were realistic while 23 stated they were somewhat realistic. In contrast, 38 officers believed that the force-on-force exercises they had participated in were not realistic.

The reasons for the contrast vary but according to some protective force officers they were not allowed to run up stairwells, climb fences, or exceed the speed limit in patrol vehicles. Some protective force officers at one site reported that for safety reasons they were no longer allowed to deploy on the roof of a facility although this position provided a significant advantage over adversaries approaching the facility. Some contractor protective force managers agreed that safety requirements limited the kind of realistic force-on-force training and other forms of realistic training that are needed to ensure effective protective force performance. (**Attachment 4, pg. 17**)

Communication Equipment

According to the DOE protective force manual, protective force personnel must have the capability to communicate information. The radios used must be capable of two-way communications, provide intelligible voice communications, and be readily available in sufficient numbers to equip protective force personnel. In addition, a sufficient number of batteries must be available and maintained in a charged condition to support routine, emergency and response operations.

However, according to GAO, protective force officers reported problems with their radio communications systems. Specifically, 66 of the 105 protective force officers reported that they did not always have

dependable radio communications, with 23 officers identifying sporadic battery life and 29 officers reporting poor reception at some locations on site as the two most significant problems. Some protective force officers believe that radio communications were not sufficient to support their operations and could not be relied on to transfer information between officers if a terrorist attack occurred. In addition, some security officials said other forms of communications, such as telephones, cellular telephones, and pagers, were provided for protective forces to ensure that they could communicate effectively. **(Attachment 4, pg. 19)**

Personal Protection Equipment

According to the DOE protective force manual, security personnel are required wear body armor or at the very least body armor is to be stationed in a way that allows quick access to respond to an attack without negatively impacting response times. In addition, protective force personnel should have protective masks that provide for nuclear, chemical, and biological protection. Other additional chemical protective gear and procedures are delegated to the sites.

GAO found at one site that protective body armor was not issued because the site had requested and received in July 2003 a waiver to deviate from the requirement to equip all protective force personnel with body armor. The waiver was sought for a number of reasons, including the (1) increased potential for heat-related injuries while wearing body armor during warm weather, (2) increased equipment load that armor would place on protective force members, (3) costs of acquiring the necessary quantity of body armor and the subsequent replacement costs, and (4) associated risks of not providing all protective force personnel with body armor could be mitigated by using cover provided at the site by natural and man-made barriers. According to a site security official interviewed by GAO, this waiver is currently being reviewed because of the increased threat contained in the DBT. **(Attachment 4, pgs. 19-20)**

At the four sites with special response teams, GAO found that the teams all had special suits that allowed them to operate and fight in environments that might be chemically contaminated. However, GAO found one site did not provide chemical protection equipment, and expected protective force personnel to evacuate along with other site workers. In

addition, GAO found at another site that protective force personnel were expected to fight in chemically contaminated environments with no additional protective gear for its officers other than standard-duty issue long-sleeved shirts and the required protective masks.

Protective Force Vehicles

According to the DOE protective force manual, protective force vehicles must be reliable commensurate with their intended functions. The vehicles must be maintained in serviceable condition, with preventive maintenance performed at intervals that meet or exceed the manufacturer recommendations.

GAO found nearly half (14 of 30) of the protective force officers interviewed at two sites reported patrol vehicles were old, in poor physical condition and not suitable for pursuit and recovery missions. Some reported maintenance as a significant problem, with one officer observing that more vehicles were in the shop than on patrol. Some protective force officers also reported that door handles on patrol vehicles did not work, which made it difficult for them to enter and exit the vehicles.

GAO also found that ESE sites currently do not have the same level of vehicle protection as NNSA sites that also have Category I special nuclear material. Specifically, while not a DOE requirement, all NNSA sites with Category I special nuclear material operate armored vehicles. However, GAO found only one of the five ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material operated armored vehicles. (**Attachment 4, pg. 20**)

2. How effectively is DOE implementing the DBT and coordinating security efforts across the Office of Energy, Science and Environment?

According to GAO, to successfully defend against the much larger terrorist threat contained in the DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include (1) the transformation of current protective forces into an "elite force," (2) the development and deployment of new security technologies, (3) the consolidation and elimination of special nuclear material, and (4) organizational improvements within ESE's security program. However, some are very concerned ESE will be unable to implement these security

improvements by October 2008 because the initiatives are in early stages of development and will require significant commitment of resources and coordination across ESE. (**Attachment 4, pg. 21**)

Creation of an “Elite Force”

The Secretary of Energy has proposed transforming the current protective force that safeguards special nuclear material into an “elite force” with training and capabilities similar to the military’s Special Forces units. However, creating this elite force is a complex undertaking and will be a challenge to fully realize by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline.

According to GAO, protective force officers generally support the elite force concept. Most ESE protective force officers (74 out of 105) reported that they are not at all confident in their current ability to defeat the new threats contained in the DBT. In particular, some protective force officers believed that they would be outgunned and overwhelmed by the terrorist force identified in the DBT. In addition, some feared they could be surprised by a large terrorist force because of the physical layout of their sites.

Despite broad support and some progress, some believe ESE is not moving quickly enough to address the increased DBT threat level. DOE has been working on a streamlined overall security policy for nearly 2 years. Once this streamlined policy is formally issued, (now scheduled for summer 2005), DOE’s draft implementation plans for an elite force call for the new policy to immediately undergo revision to incorporate elements of the elite force concept. However, DOE’s Office of Security has not yet identified a time frame for completing these actions. (**Attachment 4, pg. 24**)

In addition, to accommodate an elite force DOE officials believe that broader DOE policies will have to be revised. Specifically, because the protective forces at ESE sites operate under separate contracts and separate collective bargaining agreements, there is no uniform benefit or retirement plan for protective forces, and these benefits, according to one contractor security official, differ considerably among sites. To make the effective transition to an elite force some protective force managers believe early

retirement incentives and more attractive retirement packages will be needed. **(Attachment 4, pg. 25)**

According to GAO, given the complexity of creating an elite force implementing all the measures associated with the elite force concept will take about 5 years to complete. With this timeline, the development of the elite force will be underway by the DBT's implementation deadline of October 2008, but the full benefit of an elite force, according to DOE's own preliminary plans, will not be realized until fiscal year 2010.

Development and Deployment of New Security Technologies

According to GAO, DOE is seeking to improve the effectiveness and survivability of its protective forces through the development and deployment of new security technologies. The DOE believes new and advanced technologies can reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an attack and can provide additional response time to meet and defeat an attack. Currently, many of the ESE sites possess some advanced security technology. However, funding for the technology and systems development has been reduced in recent years. Specifically, DOE provided over \$20 million for this program in fiscal year 2004. However, DOE only requested \$14.5 million for this program in fiscal year 2006, approximately 1 percent of the entire DOE security program budget. Moreover, the program has had only limited success in developing technologies that can actually be deployed. **(Attachment 4, pgs. 25-26)**

Consolidation and Elimination of Special Nuclear Material

An element of ESE's current strategy for meeting the October 2008 deadline for compliance with the DBT includes the consolidation and elimination of special nuclear materials between and among ESE sites. However, according to GAO, neither ESE nor DOE has developed a comprehensive, department wide plan to achieve the needed cooperation and agreement among the sites and program offices to consolidate special nuclear material. In the absence of such a comprehensive, coordinated plan, consolidation of special nuclear material by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is unlikely. **(Attachment 4, pg. 27)**

Specific ESE sites considered for consolidation of special nuclear material include:

Savannah River Site: An Office of Environmental Management (EM) site, Savannah River is the main repository for plutonium and stores it in three locations on site. In November 2004, EM directed the site to consolidate all current and future storage of Category I special nuclear material into a single area by fiscal year 2007. According to DOE, this consolidation will free up over 100 protective force officers who currently guard facilities at two other areas. It will also allow for a substantially increased protective force presence at the single remaining area and could save the site over \$100 million in expected costs to implement measures to defend the site against the 2004 DBT. (**Attachment 4 pg. 27**)

Others disagree with this assessment. According to the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) DOE should consider building a Plutonium Immobilization Plant and the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility at Pantex instead, where the vast majority of the plutonium pits are currently stored and more easily protected. POGO estimates DOE could save approximately \$460 million by transferring Savannah River special nuclear material to the NNSA Pantex site. (**Web Resource 7**)

Hanford Site: Hanford is another EM site and plans to transfer most of its special nuclear material to the Savannah River Site by the end of fiscal year 2006. However, according to GAO, a number of factors threaten to delay this transfer of material. These factors include shipping and load restrictions on transporting special nuclear material across the United States, the Savannah River site's inability to store some of Hanford's special nuclear material in its present configuration, and the Savannah River site's current lack of facilities to permanently dispose of Hanford's special nuclear material. Faced with these challenges, EM decided in February 2005 to postpone shipping material from Hanford until these issues could be resolved. Hanford will now have to expend additional funds of about \$85 million annually to protect these materials against the 2004 DBT.

Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and Argonne National Laboratory-West: Managed by the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology, the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory plans to have Category I special nuclear material

removed to the near-by Argonne National Laboratory-West site, which has a continuing Category I special nuclear material mission. However, according to GAO, a recent DOE site assistance visit suggested that several other facilities at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory may have some previously unrecognized Category I special nuclear material. Site security officials report that they are trying to resolve these issues with DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance. If any of these other Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory facilities do have Category I special nuclear material, they will require additional protection, which could severely damage the DBT implementation plans for both Idaho sites.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory: Oak Ridge National Laboratory is an Office of Science (OS) site. OS plans to eliminate its Category I special material. Current plans call for down-blending this material to less attractive forms. The Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology is responsible for this down-blending program. However, the costs for this program have risen substantially. In addition, the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology and the Office of Science have not formally agreed on which program office will bear the brunt of the estimated \$53 million annual security costs required to meet the implementation deadline for the DBT. If these issues can be resolved, down-blending operations are scheduled to begin in fiscal year 2009 and to be completed in fiscal year 2012. If down-blending operations do not take place and as long as the material remains on site, Oak Ridge National Laboratory will face high additional security costs approaching an additional \$43 million each year. **(Attachment 4, pg. 28)**

ESE Security Organization Improvements

According to GAO, ESE's current organization is not well suited to meeting the challenges associated with implementing the DBT. Specifically, the position of the Director for ESE Security has no programmatic authority or staff. This lack of authority limits the director's ability to help facilitate ESE-wide cooperation on such issues as oversight and implementation of the DBT, material down-blending at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and material consolidation at other ESE sites.

In addition, ESE does not have a consolidated headquarters security office. In April 2005, ESE Under Secretary Garman stated that ESE was composed of institutional stovepipes and that this structure has hampered strategic management within ESE. **(Web Resource 8)** ESE has explored creating a consolidated headquarters security office, but each of the three program offices examined by GAO continues to maintain its own security offices that are each organized and staffed differently.

WITNESS TESTIMONY

Mr. Eugene E Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability Office will testify about how well DOE ESE is positioned to protect the nuclear material and operations from today's threat.

Mr. Gregory H. Friedman, Inspector General, Department of Energy will testify about the DOE Office of Inspector General management challenges and protective force training.

Mr. Glenn S. Podonsky, Director, Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, Department of Energy will testify about DBT implementation of the denial strategy and performance standards at DOE/ESE sites.

Dr. Lawrence Brede, Wackenhut DOE Operations will testify about Wackenhut security efforts across at ESE sites.

Mr. George Roberts, Legislative Director, Service Employees International Union (SEIU) will testify about DBT implementation and coordination of security efforts across DOE/ESE sites as they relate to protective force training and readiness to handle threats.

Mr. Robert Walsh, Security Manager, Office of Energy, Science and Environment, Department of Energy will testify about DBT implementation and coordination of security efforts across DOE/ESE sites.

ATTACHMENTS

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2. The Department of Energy, *Organization Chart, June 27, 2005.*
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WITNESS LIST

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